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LAW AND ECONOMY. By Kelvin Jones. London: Academic Press. 
1982. Pp. xvi, 190. $31. 
Whether the American antitrust laws have effectively accom-
plished their various goals has been the subject of much debate. 1 In 
Law and Economy, Professor J ones2 sides with those who regard the 
antitrust laws as failures, but he differs from most .critics in his ap-
proach to that conclusion. Professor Jones seeks to explain the inef-
fectiveness of the antitrust laws through a sociological analysis of the 
interrelationship between law and economy. He argues that the na-
ture of this interrelationship and its place in the general social order 
renders antitrust law not only presently ineffective but inherently in-
capable of affecting the process of monopolization. 
The root of Jones' analysis lies in a rejection of earlier views of 
law and economy. All of these views possess the same flaw of re-
garding law and economy as separate entities (pp. 18-43). From this 
assumption follows the conclusion that the law can serve as an in-
dependent regulator of economic relations and can mold these rela-
tions to conform with desired goals: "The mere existence of antitrust 
legislation implies that law and economy are interrelated in a man-
ner which enables the relationship of regulation to be valid" (p. vii). 
Rejecting the conventional assumption, Jones argues that law 
and economy are not distinct. According to Jones, both are aspects 
of the same overarching social relation of ownership. Analysis of 
ownership thus becomes Jones' focal point, since the idea of a rela-
tionship between law and economy constitutes a misleading ap-
proach to economic and legal questions. 
In pursuing this analysis, Jones proposes a "typology of owner-
ship" (pp. 71-104). Although different types of ownership exist, each 
type consists of three distinct relationships: title, control, and posses-
sion. Jones deliberately fails to define these terms precisely,3 but he 
does off er some hints as to their meanings. Title refers not only to 
formal legal title but also to "the sorts of calculations which govern 
the circulation oflegal titles" (p. 77). In other words, the social rela-
tion of title involves not only the legal relationship that allows an 
I. See, e.g., T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 207-30 (1937); M. REAGAN, THE 
MANAGED ECONOMY 173-75, 237-39 (1963); Blair,Anlilrusl Penalties: Deterrence and Compen-
sation, 1980 UTAH L. REv. 57; Breit & Elzinga,Anlilrusl E,!forcemenl and Economic Efficiency: 
The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J. L. & EcoN. 329 (1974); Rashid, Whal is Righi wilh 
Anlilrusl?, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1960); Wheeler,Anli/rus/ Treble-Damage Actions: Do They 
Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1319 (1973). 
2. Kelvin Jones is a member of the faculty of La Trobe University, Victoria, Australia. 
3. According to Jones, "Defining the relations in general is to some extent counterproduc-
tive since it would appear to belie their status as determinate relations of ownership dependent 
upon a specific context." P. 75. 
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owner to transfer his ownership but also all of his reasons for and his 
methods of doing so. Control is both the power to dispose of means 
of production or to direct them to a particular use as well as the 
manner in which this power is exercised. Possession, a narrower con-
cept than control, is the power to regulate the relationship of labor to 
the means of production and the social calculations that go into such 
regulatory decisions. Thus, although an owner of a factory controls 
his means of production, the factory manager might possess those 
means. Jones attempts to explain further the meaning of the rela-
tions of title, control, and possession by describing their operation in 
four different, broad categories of forms of ownership: feudal, pri-
vate (bourgeois), corporate, and Soviet. 
The two forms of ownership relevant to Jones' discussion of the 
antitrust laws are private and corporate. The distinction between the 
two apparently resides in the calculations that underlie the relations 
of control and possession. In corporate ownership, these relations 
are divorced from each other to a much greater extent than they are 
in private ownership. But because the relations of control and pos-
session are distinct even in private ownership, Jones in effect argues 
that a difference in the degree of separation between control and 
possession ultimately becomes a difference in kind. 
The distinction between private and corporate ownership is vital 
for Jones' indictment of the antitrust laws. Although monopoly can 
arise only from corporate relations (p. 150 n.2), the antitrust laws are 
designed for a system based on the private form of ownership. The 
law in effect treats corporations as individuals by "attaching penal-
ties to individual and corporate authors" (p. 147). By failing to rec-
ognize the distinction between individual and corporate ownership, 
the cure of the law does not match the disease of monopolistic be-
havior: "[I]n treating the corporation as if it would respond, either 
collectively or in person, in the way in which individuals are sup-
posed to behave is to court disaster. Fines, imprisonment and de-
crees are, at best, inappropriate and, at worst, irrelevant mechanisms 
of regulation" (p. 177). Thus, although such sanctions may affect the 
corporate owners, they do not further the antitrust goal of preventing 
monopoly. Since the system of antitrust regulation is rooted in pri-
vate ownership, the regulatory mechanism is inapposite to corporate 
ownership and is, therefore, doomed to failure. 
Before evaluating Jones' thesis, three general deficiencies of the 
book are worth noting. The first deficiency is lack of clarity. 
Though the book may prove interesting to sociologists, it is largely 
incomprehensible to others. If nothing else, Professor Jones has 
proven that lawyers and economists do not have a monopoly on con-
fusing jargon. The second general deficiency is lack of precision. 
Not only are title, possession, and control ill-defined, but so are the 
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social relations that ostensibly provide a contextual meaning for 
these terms. Moreover, Jones never identifies what must be changed 
in order to make the regulation of monopoly effective. The third 
deficiency is lack of novelty. Although Jones' sociological distinc-
tions are arguably more comprehensive than previous systems -
perhaps too all-encompassing to be useful for analysis - the distinc-
tions do not produce any particularly startling results. Jones is not 
the first to argue that large corporations may behave qualitatively 
differently from small, closely-held firms. Galbraith is the best 
known and most recent expositor of this position.4 Earlier seminal 
thinkers include Thorstein Veblen and Berle and Means.5 With re-
gard to the limitations of antitrust law, Tumer6 has argued that no 
effective remedy exists for oligopolistic interdependence in pricing. 
Rather than present new ideas, Professor Jones has cloaked some old 
ones in a fog of ill-defined terms and placed them in a sociological 
context. 
In addition to the general deficiencies of the book, Professor 
Jones' thesis - that the antitrust laws are inherently incapable of 
effectively regulating corporate behavior - is also suspect on at least 
two grounds. First, Jones erroneously assumes that the single goal of 
the antitrust laws is the prevention of monopoly power. Notwith-
standing Professor Jones' history lesson (pp. 160-74), this tunnel vi-
sion as to the goals of the Sherman Act seems dubious in light of the 
values of the diverse groups that coalesced to enact the Sherman Act. 
The assumption of a single goal also seems unwarranted in light of 
the textual generality of the Sherman Act. The Act is in effect a 
delegation to the courts of the authority to formulate antitrust policy, 
and the common law process almost certainly adds new values and 
goals to antitrust policy. 
Since Jones evaluates the effectiveness of the antitrust laws solely 
in relation to the goal of monopoly prevention, the existence of other 
competing goals seriously undermines his indictment. It is clear to-
day, even if it was not clear in 1890, that other goals are involved. 
For example, the judicial "rule of reason" for deciding antitrust 
cases countenances monopoly power if other public interests are in-
volved. Another possible goal, consumer welfare, 7 is not necessarily 
the same as prevention of monopoly. For example, a very large firm 
4. See, e.g., J.K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967). 
5. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP• 
ER1Y (1932); T. VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP (1923); T. VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904). 
6. Turner, The .Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and 
Refusals To .Deal, 15 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962). 
7. Some have argued that consumer welfare ought to be the only goal of the antitrust laws. 
See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). 
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might have lower costs due to economies of scale but might also 
have the market power to charge a price in excess of marginal cost. 
The efficiency consequences of replacing the giant firm with smaller, 
higher-cost producers are difficult to determine. 
A second major difficulty with Jones' antitrust argument lies in 
his narrow definition of law. Jones limits his definition of law to 
rules arising from the private property relationship. This limitation, 
coupled with Jones' contention that legal regulation arising from a 
private property system cannot deal with monopoly, leads to the 
conclusion that the whole concept of law must be set aside as a 
means of controlling monopolies. The obvious response to this con-
clusion is that a law could be devised to deal with the relationship of 
corporate ownership. For example, Congress could dispense with 
the corporate relation and thereby with the problem of monopoly by 
forbidding the corporate form of ownership altogether. This prohi-
bition would necessarily be a legal action and, one would think, an 
effective one. Of course, it is not surprising that Congress has not 
chosen to enact such drastic legislation. 
Perhaps Professor Jones' sociological typology of ownership, 
with some refinement and clarification of the definitions, may be-
come a useful device. Two important refinements would be a de-
lineation of the conditions under which one relation of ownership 
becomes another and an explanation of whether the forms of owner-
ship are mutually exclusive or, rather, points on a continuum. In 
Law and Economy, the vagueness of the definitions and the subse-
quent opacity of the argument render judgment as to the usefulness 
of the typology impossible. One suspects, however, that the analysis 
presented here is not only inadequate from. a legal standpoint but 
also bad sociology. In ignoring the interrelationship of multiple val-
ues and in refusing to define terms with any precision, Professor 
Jones defeats the sort of encompassing scientific analysis to which 
sociology aspires. He also produces a remarkably unenlightening 
book. 
